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“A NUANCED APPROACH”: HOW WASHINGTON
COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE
Kaleigh Powell*
Abstract: As of 2015, the vast majority of the American public had some form of health
insurance, mostly provided by private companies. While some customers might, at some
point, contemplate suing their insurance provider—for breach of contract, consumer
protection statute violation, or some other cause—these potential plaintiffs are not likely to
get far in many cases. The reason is the little-known “filed rate doctrine,” a court-created rule
that bars lawsuits against many agency-regulated entities. The filed rate doctrine is based on
the fact that many states, including Washington, require health insurers to file their rates with
a regulatory agency—and have those rates approved—before they can start charging
customers. Because companies get their rates approved by these regulatory agencies, courts
invoke the filed rate doctrine to prevent plaintiffs from bringing actions that seek to
“challenge” these agency-approved rates. Some courts, however, have stretched the filed rate
doctrine too far, relying on the doctrine to dismiss breach of contract and state consumer
protection act claims that do not challenge the actual rate paid.
In a recent Washington case, the Washington State Supreme Court left open the question
of whether it would broadly construe the filed rate doctrine and adopt a rule that applies the
doctrine to cases that are only tangentially related to agency-approved rates. This Comment
seeks to address this gap in the Washington case law and argues that Washington courts
should not apply the filed rate doctrine to cases involving health insurers where the plaintiffs
do not allege that their rates are too high. First, this Comment describes the current health
insurance regulatory framework in Washington, Oregon, and California and the application
of the filed rate doctrine in those states. It then argues why, in Washington in particular,
courts should use—as the Washington Court of Appeals recently described it—a “nuanced
approach” in their application of the filed rate doctrine, not using it to bar breach of contract
or Washington Consumer Protection Act claims, but keeping it to its original purpose: to
prevent lawsuits that seek to challenge the actual rate paid.

INTRODUCTION
In 2015, about ninety-one percent of the United States population had
some form of health insurance. 1 While at some point many of these
millions of customers might have a cause of action to sue their health

* J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Washington School of Law. Special thanks to Jason T.
Dennett, who not only gave the assignment that led to this Comment, but also provided substantial
and helpful feedback on early drafts. The author only hopes to have done credit to Mr. Dennett’s
mentorship.
1. Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION,
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?currentTimeframe=0 [https://perma.cc/R6JDRBN4].
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insurance provider, most are probably unaware of the court-made rule
that will prevent many of their lawsuits: the “filed rate doctrine.” Where
regulated entities—like insurance providers and utility companies—file
their rates and get them approved by a regulating agency, courts invoke
the filed rate doctrine to dismiss lawsuits that challenge the
reasonableness of those rates. 2 The doctrine essentially holds that a
“filed rate” is “per se reasonable and cannot be the subject of legal
action against the private entity that filed it.” 3
The United States Supreme Court first established the filed rate
doctrine in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. 4 It is now
generally accepted that the “[t]he purposes of the ‘filed rate’ doctrine are
twofold: (1) to preserve the agency’s primary jurisdiction to determine
the reasonableness of rates, and (2) to insure that regulated entities
charge only those rates approved by the agency.” 5 That is, the purpose of
the doctrine is to preserve the ability of the agency to carry out its
legislatively-designed function of approving rates and to prevent
discrimination among customers in the rates charged. 6 These two
purposes are often referred to as the “non-justiciability” strand and the
“anti-discrimination” strand of the doctrine, respectively. 7 In cases that
would seek to undermine the ability of the agency to determine rates
(what some courts call a typical “justiciability” case), “the court is asked
to determine a lower rate by assessing how much defendants have
inflated the rate through their alleged wrongdoing.” 8 Courts refer to the
doctrine as the “filed rate” and “filed tariff” doctrine interchangeably. 9
The filed rate doctrine, of course, has its critics.10 Scholars have
argued that the doctrine should be presumptively inapplicable unless the
regulating entity can show that its approval of the filed rate was not

2. Tenore v. AT&T Wireless, 136 Wash. 2d 322, 332, 962 P.2d 104, 108 (1998).
3. Id. at 331, 962 P.2d at 108 (citing Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.
1994)).
4. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
5. McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, 182 Wash. 2d 936, 942, 347 P.3d 872, 875 (2015) (quoting
Tenore, 136 Wash. 2d at 331–32, 962 P.2d at 108).
6. Id.
7. Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 806 F. Supp. 1112, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d 27 F.3d 17
(2d Cir. 1992).
8. Id. (citing Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409 (1986)).
9. Vonda Mallicoat Laughlin, The Filed Rate Doctrine and the Insurance Arena, 18 CONN. INS.
L.J. 373, 375 (2012); see also AT&T Co. v. Central Office Tel., 524 U.S. 214 (1998) (using the
terms interchangeably throughout).
10. In re Title Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 847 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
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arbitrary 11 or that the doctrine simply should not apply at all because it
undermines the ability of regulators and courts to promote competition
and deter market abuses. 12 But so far Washington courts, at least, have
not taken up the call to eliminate or modify the filed rate doctrine
pursuant to critical responses.
Though courts first applied the doctrine to suits sounding in
antitrust, 13 many courts now apply the filed rate doctrine to cases
involving breach of contract and state consumer protection acts. 14 Courts
reason that permitting a plaintiff to recover damages from defendants
who have their rates approved by regulatory agencies would, in effect,
amount to a challenge to the rates themselves. 15 This Comment argues
that such an extension of the filed rate doctrine—specifically into breach
of contract and state consumer protection act claims in the health
insurance arena—is both contrary to the doctrine’s core justifications
and an unjustifiable burden on citizens who should otherwise have the
right to bring suit against these regulated entities.
This Comment proceeds in six Parts. Part I describes the emergence
of the filed rate doctrine and its repeated validation in the federal context
by the Supreme Court of the United States, explaining in detail the
Court’s development of the non-discrimination and the non-justiciability
strands of the doctrine. Part II focuses on the application of the federal
filed rate doctrine in federal courts; it describes how, though courts
purport to permit breach of contract claims involving a filed rate, courts
around the country still use the doctrine to effectively bar these claims in
practice by preventing any meaningful measure of damages. The filed
rate doctrine, however, was created by a federal court to apply to claims
related to federal regulation, so states are not required to apply the
doctrine to cases where state regulators determine reasonable rates16—
though many do. 17 Part III addresses state application of state versions of
the filed rate doctrine; specifically, Part III describes the health
11. Julia Gorodetsky, Analogy by Necessity: The Filed Rate Doctrine and Judicial Review of
Agency Inaction, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2009).
12. Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a Deregulatory Era, 56
VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1597 (2003).
13. Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 159–60 (1922).
14. See Part II, infra.
15. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. N. States Power Co., 764 N.W.2d 34, 38 (Minn. 2009) (alleging breach
of contract).
16. See Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 806 F. Supp. 1112, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d 27
F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1994).
17. See, e.g., McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, 182 Wash. 2d 936, 943–44, 347 P.3d 872, 876
(2015) (applying the filed rate doctrine to bar plaintiffs’ claims).
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insurance regulatory framework and the application of the filed rate
doctrine in Washington, Oregon, and California, drawing on federal
precedent from Part II. This Comment focuses on these states in
particular because of the way that—despite the proximity of each—they
apply the doctrine very differently, if at all. Although this Comment
focuses on the application of the filed rate doctrine in the health
insurance arena in particular, each of these Parts relies on the application
of the doctrine to regulated utilities as a way of explaining how the
doctrine functions generally. Finally, Part IV concludes by laying out the
reasons that Washington courts should not apply the filed rate doctrine
to bar claims for breach of contract or violation of the Washington
Consumer Protection Act (WCPA), but instead should apply a “nuanced
approach” that determines whether the claims are only tangentially
related to the rates paid. 18
I.

THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE EMERGES OUT OF CASES
CHALLENGING THE RATES CUSTOMERS PAID

A.

Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. Establishes the
Filed Rate Doctrine

Keogh is generally credited as the case that established the filed rate
doctrine as a court-made rule, though the Supreme Court in that case
never used the term “filed rate.” 19 In that case, Keogh brought antitrust
claims against eight railroad companies and twelve individuals, alleging
that the defendants conspired to set freight rates and eliminate
competition between their various companies. 20 The question before the
Supreme Court was whether Keogh could sustain a private right of
action under Section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act for the defendants’ alleged
conduct. 21
The defendants noted that they had filed their rates with the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC), 22 which had then, upon Keogh’s

18. See McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, 182 Wash. App. 1, 14, 328 P.3d 940, 947 (2014), rev’d
182 Wash. 2d 936, 944, 347 P.3d 872, 876 (2015).
19. Allan Kanner, The Filed Rate Doctrine and Insurance Fraud Litigation, 76 N.D. L. REV. 1, 2
n.2 (2000).
20. Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 159–60 (1922).
21. Id. at 161.
22. The ICC was an agency created by Congress to “regulate construction, operation, and
abandonment of railroad lines.” Greg H. Hirakawa, Comment, Preserving Transportation Corridors
for the Future: Another Look at Railroad Deeds in Washington State, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 481,
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complaint, suspended the use of the increased rates until the ICC could
conduct hearings. 23 Keogh himself participated in the hearings, but the
ICC ultimately approved the rates over his objection.24 Keogh then sued,
claiming as damages the “difference in rates” between what he was
paying under the prior rate schedule and what he was forced to pay as a
result of the ICC approval. 25 He also claimed damages in the lost value
of one of his factories as the result of lost profits from the increased
freight rates. 26
The Supreme Court rejected Keogh’s claims for several reasons, 27
noting at the outset of its analysis that “[a]ll the rates fixed were
reasonable and non-discriminatory. That was settled by the proceedings
before the Commission.” 28
In rejecting Keogh’s claims, the Court first determined that neither
Keogh nor any private plaintiff could, by definition, state a claim under
Section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act because no plaintiff could meet the
injury requirement under the statute. 29 The Court described the injury
requirement as follows:
Section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act gives a right of action to one
who has been “injured in his business or property.” Injury
implies violation of a legal right. The legal rights of shipper as
against carrier in respect to a rate are measured by the published
tariff. Unless and until suspended or set aside, this rate is made,
for all purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper.
The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or enlarged
by either contract or tort of the carrier.30
Because a plaintiff could not claim violation of any legal right, there
was no way for Keogh or any other plaintiff to meet the statute’s injury
requirement.
Perhaps more importantly for future filed rate cases, the Court
reasoned that courts must apply this “stringent rule” “because otherwise
the paramount purpose of Congress—prevention of unjust
486 (2001). The ICC was abolished in 1995 and replaced with the Surface Transportation
Board. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Surface Trans. Bd., 162 F.3d 101, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
23. Keogh, 260 U.S. at 160.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 162.
28. Id. at 161.
29. Id. at 162.
30. Id. at 163.
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discrimination—might be defeated.” 31 In other words, if courts
permitted a private plaintiff to recover for damages resulting from
artificially high rates, then that plaintiff would, in effect, pay a different
rate than that plaintiff’s non-suing counterpart. 32 Keogh argued that a
discriminatory rate would not necessarily ensue from permitting a cause
of action under Section 7 because any person might bring suit and obtain
the benefit of a reduced rate. 33 The Court rejected that argument, though,
noting that “[u]niform treatment would not result, even if all sued, unless
the highly improbable happened, and the several juries and courts gave
to each the same measure of relief.” 34
According to the Court, Keogh also had a causation problem: he, like
other plaintiffs attempting to bring suit under Section 7, would not only
have to prove that he would have paid a lower rate in the absence of a
conspiracy, he would also have to prove that this “hypothetical lower
rate” would have been lawful under the Act to Regulate Commerce and
would have been approved by the ICC. 35 The Court refused to submit
that question—whether Keogh’s hypothetical rates would be
discriminatory under the Act—to the ICC. “[B]y no conceivable
proceeding could the question whether a hypothetical lower rate would
under conceivable conditions have been discriminatory, be submitted to
the Commission for determination.” 36 That point, like the others already
addressed by the Court, proved fatal to Keogh’s claim because that
“hypothetical question [was] one with which plaintiff would necessarily
be confronted at trial” and was one that the Court determined Keogh
would be unable to prove there. 37
Finally, the Court determined that Keogh could not bring his antitrust
action challenging the approved rates because the damages he alleged
were “purely speculative.” 38 Specifically, the Court determined that no
court or jury would be able to say that the benefit of lower rates would

31. Id.
32. Id. (“If a shipper could recover under § 7 of the Anti-Trust Act for damages resulting from the
exaction of a rate higher than that which would otherwise have prevailed, the amount recovered
might, like a rebate, operate to give him a preference over his trade competitors.”).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 163–64.
36. Id. at 164.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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flow directly to Keogh—“[t]he benefit might have gone to his
customers, or conceivably, to the ultimate consumer.” 39
Thus, without using the term “filed rate doctrine,” the Court created a
rule that would, as it was elaborated and expanded, eventually bar many
suits against entities with agency-approved rates.
B.

The Supreme Court Elaborates on the “Non-Justiciability” Strand
of Filed Rate and Applies It to State Law Actions that Implicate
Federally-Filed Rates

Several decades after Keogh, the Court continued protecting agencyapproved rates from collateral attack in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v.
Northwestern Public Service Co. 40 and Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v.
Hall. 41 Together these cases illustrate what has come to be known as the
“non-justiciability” strand of the filed rate doctrine: the idea that courts
are not equipped to make a decision on what rates would be
“reasonable” because Congress has delegated that decision to the
agency.
In Montana-Dakota, the plaintiff, Montana-Dakota Utilities
Company, alleged that it was being charged “unreasonably high prices”
for the defendant’s electricity. 42 Though the rates that the plaintiff paid
were approved by the Federal Power Commission pursuant to the
Federal Power Act, the plaintiff alleged that it had been unable to
“protest to the Commission to have reasonable rates and charges
established” because, at the time the rates were set, the plaintiff
company and defendant company shared a board of directors—
preventing the plaintiff company from challenging the rates set. 43 The
Court ruled, however, that Congress had delegated the authority to
determine reasonable rates to the agency, so courts had no place in
determining what a “reasonable” rate might be:
Statutory reasonableness is an abstract quality represented by an
area rather than a pinpoint. It allows a substantial spread
between what is unreasonable because too low and what is
unreasonable because too high. To reduce the abstract concept

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 165.
341 U.S. 246 (1950).
453 U.S. 571 (1981).
Montana-Dakota, 341 U.S. at 248.
Id.
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of reasonableness to concrete expression in dollars and cents is
the function of the Commission. 44
The plaintiff, therefore, could not state a cause of action under the
Federal Power Act for unreasonable rates. 45 Rather, the only rate that the
plaintiff had a right to was the rate set by the Commission—“the courts
can assume no right to a different [rate] on the ground that, in its
opinion, it is the only or the more reasonable one.” 46
This concept reappeared years later in Arkansas Louisiana Gas,
where the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether
the filed rate doctrine “forbids a state court to calculate damages in a
breach-of-contract action based on an assumption that had a higher rate
been filed, the Commission would have approved it.” 47 In Arkansas
Louisiana Gas, the plaintiffs were producers of natural gas who entered
into a contract with the defendant, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company
(Arkla) under which the plaintiffs would sell their gas to the defendant. 48
The contract had a fixed price, but it also included a “favored nations”
clause that provided that the plaintiffs would be paid more for their sales
to Arkla if Arkla purchased gas from another party at a rate higher than
what it was paying the plaintiffs. 49 The plaintiffs filed both the contract
and their rates with the Federal Power Commission and “obtained from
the Commission a certificate authorizing the sale of gas at the rates
specified in the contract.” 50
Years later, Arkla purchased leases from the United States and started
producing gas on the leaseholds. 51 The plaintiffs eventually filed a state
court action complaining that the lease payments had triggered the
favored nations provision and sought “as damages an amount equal to
the difference between the price they actually were paid in the
intervening years and the price they would have paid had the favored
nations clause gone into effect.” 52
As it had in Montana-Dakota, the Court determined that the
plaintiff’s requested relief—reasonable rates that the defendant would
have paid another party—was a nonjusticiable issue; that is, under the
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 251.
Id. at 251–52.
Id. at 252.
Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 573 (1981) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id.
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Natural Gas Act, “the rates that a regulated gas company files with the
Commission for the sale and transportation of natural gas are lawful only
if they are ‘just and reasonable,’” and “[n]o court may substitute its own
judgment on reasonableness for the judgment of the Commission.” 53
“The authority to decide whether the rates are reasonable is vested by
§ 4 of the Act solely in the Commission.” 54
In Montana-Dakota and Arkansas Louisiana, then, the Court
emphasized that one of the key purposes of the filed rate doctrine is to
prevent judicial interference in decisions delegated to regulating
agencies, especially because a court is ill-equipped to make policy
decisions about “reasonable” rates.
C.

The Supreme Court Reaffirms Keogh in Square D

The Supreme Court was given the chance to overrule Keogh—and the
filed rate doctrine as a whole—in Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier
Tariff Bureau. 55 In that case, various shipping companies brought a
private action against defendant motor carriers for antitrust in violation
of the Sherman Act. The question presented was whether the carriers
could be subject to treble damages if the shipping companies proved the
allegations in their complaint.56 The Court conducted its analysis in three
parts, considering: (1) the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint;
(2) the impact of Keogh on the case at hand; and (3) “the extent to which
the rule of the Keogh case remains part of our law today.” 57 The
discussion here focuses only on the last two parts, which relate to the
filed rate doctrine.
The Court quickly handled the question of Keogh’s application,
finding that the rates in Square D, like those in Keogh, were duly
submitted to and deemed lawful by the ICC. 58 The question for the
Court, then, was “whether [it] should continue to respect the rule of
Keogh,” 59 especially in light of the fact that the petitioners and the
Solicitor General were asking the Court to overrule Keogh. 60 The Court
identified a number of historical changes that might undermine its ruling
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 577.
Id.
476 U.S. 409 (1986).
Id. at 410.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 417.
Id.
Id.
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in Keogh, including: the development of class actions, which could
address the concern of “discriminatory” rates that arise where one
customer receives a damages award and another does not; “the
emergence of precedents permitting treble-damages remedies even when
there is a regulatory remedy available”; innovation in calculating
damages, which might address the fear that damages calculations might
otherwise be “speculative”; and, finally, the “development of procedures
in which judicial proceedings can be stayed pending regulatory
proceedings.” 61
Ultimately, though, the Court rejected out of hand the argument that
these “developments” should cause it to overrule Keogh, concluding that
they were “insufficient to overcome the strong presumption of continued
validity that adheres in the judicial interpretation of a statute.”62
II.

FILED RATE CASES INVOLVING BREACH OF CONTRACT
ARE GENERALLY PERMITTED, BUT THE DOCTRINE STILL
PREVENTS MOST MEASURES OF DAMAGES IN FEDERAL
COURTS

Most federal courts permit a breach of contract claim even where a
filed rate is involved. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has ruled that the
Federal Power Act preempts breach of contract claims that challenge a
filed rate, but not breach of contract claims based on another rationale.63
One such rationale was adequately asserted, according to the Fifth
Circuit, in Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 64 which “held
that . . . there is no preemption if damages were sought because the
breach [of contract] caused an increase in the quantity [of electricity]
purchased at the filed rate,” rather than an increase in the filed rate
itself. 65 Similarly, in Euclid Insurance Agencies, Inc. v. Scottsdale
Insurance Co., 66 the filed rate doctrine did not bar the plaintiff’s claim
for breach of contract because, the court reasoned, the plaintiffs had
challenged the defendant’s failure “to honor its contractual obligation to

61. Id. at 423.
62. Id. at 424. Notably, in dissent, Justice Marshall adopted the lower court opinion of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, which, in his view, “cogently and comprehensively explained why the
reasoning of [Keogh] has been rendered obsolete by subsequent developments in the law.” Id. at
424–25 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. Mirant Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 378 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2006).
64. 824 F.2d 1465 (5th Cir. 1987).
65. Mirant, 378 F.3d at 519.
66. No. 95 C 3308, 1998 WL 60775, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 1998).
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adjust rates” rather than the reasonableness of the rates themselves.67
Thus, federal courts have contemplated at least some scenarios where
the filed rate doctrine does not bar lawsuits that do not challenge the
reasonableness of the rates themselves. But while these claims are
purportedly allowed, federal courts may still dismiss these claims if the
plaintiffs’ proposed measure of damages would require a court to engage
in the same sort of reasonable rate inquiry that the legislature delegated
to the agency.
A.

Courts Dismiss Filed Rate Claims if Resolution of Those Claims
Would Require a Court to Calculate a Reasonable Rate

It appears that where plaintiffs challenge some part of a defendant’s
conduct, and not the reasonableness of the rate the defendant charged the
plaintiffs, courts still dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under the filed rate
doctrine if the plaintiffs’ damages request would require some sort of
rate calculation. As the Eighth Circuit ruled, “the underlying conduct
does not control whether the filed rate doctrine applies. Rather, the focus
for determining whether the filed rate doctrine applies is the impact the
court’s decision will have on agency procedures and rate
determinations.” 68 In other words, according to some courts, the “filed
rate doctrine prohibits a party from recovering damages measured by
comparing the filed rate and the rate that might have been approved
absent the conduct at issue.” 69
The Ninth Circuit has expressly adopted the principle that the filed
rate doctrine bars claims for damages that require reference to the filed
rate. 70 In NOS Communications, 71 the Ninth Circuit considered claims in
a multidistrict litigation from various plaintiffs asserting, inter alia, fraud
and consumer protection against defendant telecommunications
carriers. 72 The court, in affirming and reversing dismissal on the various

67. Id. (“Although the reasonableness of [defendant’s] insurance rates and the fact that the rates
were governed by regulatory agencies may be factors in deciding this issue, they are not
dispositive.”). See also Randleman v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 2d 812, 823 (N.D.
Ohio 2006) (“The filed rate doctrine is inapplicable in this action. Plaintiffs are not challenging the
reasonableness of the filed rate, but instead attempt to enforce a contract incorporating a filed
rate.”).
68. H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 1992).
69. Id. at 488; see also Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 806 F. Supp. 1112, 1121–22 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), aff’d 27 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1992).
70. See In re NOS Comms. 495 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007).
71. 495 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007).
72. Id. at 1057.
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claims under the filed rate doctrine, held that in filed rate cases, “where
the measure of damages requires comparing the rates charged under the
filed-rate with the rate that allegedly should have been charged, . . . state
claims are preempted.” 73 Plaintiffs’ claims, therefore, were only
permissible “to the extent that [they] . . . assert claims that neither attack
the rates nor require reference to the filed-rate for a calculation of
damages.” 74
B.

Federal Courts Dismiss Cases Under Filed Rate Even Where
Plaintiffs Allege Nonperformance of Contractual Obligations

There is at least one federal case where plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants failed to perform contractual obligations but the court ruled
that the filed rate doctrine still barred their claims. In Rios v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., 75 the plaintiff class alleged state law claims for
fraudulent inducement/rescission, unjust enrichment, and breach of
contract. They sought premium damages paid to State Farm Insurance
for an Upfront Endorsement Policy that State Farm ceased to honor.
State Farm moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the filed
rate doctrine barred plaintiffs from recovering premium damages. 76
Plaintiffs countered that “the return of the Upfront Endorsement
premiums, as damages, do not implicate the filed rate doctrine because
[the plaintiffs were] not ‘contesting the amount of premium set by state
regulators, the reasonableness of any rate or premium approval by any
state or federal regulatory agency or insurance department,’” and
because, significantly, the plaintiffs did “not request anything that would
require the court to re-calculate the premium rate approved by any state
or federal regulatory agency or insurance department.” 77 Rather,
73. Id. at 1060.
74. Id. (emphasis added). A notable exception is Ellsworth v. U.S. Bank, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1063
(N.D. Cal. 2012), where the plaintiff brought a putative class action challenging the defendant U.S.
Bank’s practice of force-placing flood insurance on his real property in return for a kickback from
defendant insurance company. U.S. Bank argued that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the filed
rate doctrine. Id. at 1082. The court held that the doctrine did not apply, reasoning that “[j]ust
because the damages are based on increased costs incurred as a result of the alleged kickback
scheme does not transform a challenge to conduct and practices into a challenge to the premiums.”
Id. at 1083. See also Gallo v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 916 F. Supp. 2d 537, 548 (D.N.J. 2012) (holding
that plaintiff’s claim could proceed, despite filed rate doctrine, because plaintiff “clearly
complain[ed] of Defendant PHH Mortgage’s conduct in allegedly improperly receiving various
financial benefits through the forced-placed insurance process, and cannot be fairly read as a direct
challenge to the reasonableness of the rates charged”).
75. 469 F. Supp. 2d 727 (S.D. Iowa 2007).
76. Id. at 733.
77. Id. at 737.
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“[p]laintiffs argue that they are merely seeking to enforce the terms of
the services State Farm filed with the Commissioner, which would not
conflict with the filed rate doctrine.” 78
The court, relying on H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 79
disagreed and held that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the filed
rate doctrine because “for all practical purposes, the damages sought can
only be measured by comparing the difference between the premium
rates the Commissioner originally approved with the premium rates the
Commissioner should have approved.” 80 Specifically, the court found
that to measure the damages in Rios, it would have to determine what
portion of the plaintiffs’ premiums were being used for the Upfront
Endorsement provision and then “second guess” what rate would have
been approved for the policies without the Upfront Endorsement
provision; it refused to do so because it determined that “[t]his type of
rate making and damages concept falls squarely within the filed rate
doctrine.” 81
In Rios, then, the proposed measure of damages was a refund of the
premium equal to the market rate for the contract provision at issue (the
Upfront Provision), and the courts dismissed the damages claims. 82
Thus, while breach of contract claims are not per se barred under the
filed rate doctrine, damages calculations matter a great deal.
Specifically, courts have evinced a willingness to dismiss claims for
78. Id.
79. 954 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1992).
80. Id. at 739.
81. Id. (emphasis original) (internal citations omitted).
82. State courts, too, have similarly barred claims for nonperformance of contractual obligations
in some cases. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Northern States Power Co., 764 N.W.2d 34 (Minn. 2009). In
Hoffman, plaintiffs in a putative class action brought state law claims for breach of contract against
their electricity provider, alleging that the provider failed to meet its contractual obligation to
maintain the electrical wiring leading to plaintiffs’ homes. Id. at 38. The Court held that although
the plaintiffs could pursue injunctive relief to enforce the terms of the contract, id. at 45–46, the
filed rate doctrine precluded them from recovering compensatory damages in the amount of the
market rate of the services not rendered, id. at 48. The Court reasoned that “appellants essentially
claim an overcharge for services actually performed under the tariff, compared to the services
appellants claim the tariff required to be performed. These damages are measured as the difference
between what the appellants actually paid for the performance of the service not received and the
presumably lesser amount they would have paid had the services not been required in the tariff.” Id.
at 47. The Court found that the proposed damages calculation would require it to contravene the
dual purposes of the filed rate doctrine. Id. Firstly, the plaintiff’s proposed damages calculation
would violate the non-justiciability principle because “[t]he measure of damages in this case
is . . . inextricably linked to the filed rate.” Id. Further, this damages calculation would violate the
non-discrimination principle because such a damages award “would result in appellants paying less
for the electrical services than non-class members.” Id. at 48. The filed rate doctrine, therefore,
barred the claim. Id.
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nonperformance of a contractual obligation under the filed rate doctrine
where the plaintiffs seek a partial refund of their premium in damages.
III. STATES TAKE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO WHETHER
AND HOW TO APPLY STATE LAW VERSIONS OF THE
FILED RATE DOCTRINE
Though state courts are not required to apply the filed rate doctrine
where rates are not filed with federal government agencies, many states
have adopted their own versions of the filed rate doctrine or at least
considered adopting it. 83 Three of those states—Washington, Oregon,
and California—are now considered in turn; these states each approach
the filed rate doctrine differently despite their geographic proximity.
Washington’s application of the doctrine is uncertain—as very few cases
have addressed the issue—but there seems to be an opening for lawsuits
like breach of contract or state consumer protection act violations that do
not challenge the reasonableness of rates filed. 84 Oregon courts have
never applied the filed rate doctrine in that state—despite considering
the doctrine on at least two occasions—but have evinced a willingness to
engage in the kinds of activities the federal filed rate doctrine generally
seems to bar: requiring a refund of rates paid and asking regulating
agencies to reconsider approved rates.85 Finally, California is unusual in
that its filed rate doctrine (for most kinds of insurance) is embodied in
statute, and its lower courts expressly disagree about whether and how
the filed rate doctrine applies to regulated entities. 86
A.

Washington Has Adopted the Filed Rate Doctrine, but the
Parameters of Its Application Are Uncertain

Washington courts have had little opportunity to apply the filed rate
doctrine, as to date it has only expressly been addressed in three
published Washington cases. 87 These cases leave the parameters of the
doctrine’s application in Washington unclear. 88 This section will discuss
the health insurance regulatory framework in Washington and filed rate
83. See Laughlin, supra note 9, at 392–95.
84. See section III.A.3, infra.
85. See sections III.B.2–3, infra.
86. See section III.C, infra.
87. Those three cases are McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, 182 Wash. 2d 936, 347 P.3d 872
(2015); Tenore v. AT&T Wireless, 136 Wash. 2d 322, 962 P.2d 104 (1998); and Hardy v. Claircom
Comms. Grp., 86 Wash. App. 488, 937 P.2d 1128 (1997).
88. See section III.A.3, infra.
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precedent in the state. It will then conclude with an analysis of what the
likely continued application of the doctrine in Washington will be.
1.

The Washington Health Insurance Regulatory Framework

In Washington, the Office of the Insurance Commissioner (OIC)
approves health insurance premiums. 89 “Among its powers, the OIC may
disapprove (1) ambiguous or misleading contracts and deceptive
solicitations and (2) contracts the benefits of which are ‘unreasonable in
relation to the amount charged for the contract.’” 90 The requirements for
individual and small group filings are contained in section 284-43-6100
of the Washington Administrative Code. 91
The OIC reviews rate increase requests only from individual and
small employer 92 plans. 93 These plans make up just a small percentage
of the overall Washington insurance market—in 2014, five percent of
Washington residents with health insurance had individual plans, and
four percent received their plans from small group employers. 94 Almost
half of all Washington residents with health insurance get their insurance
through large group insurance policies. 95
The OIC regulatory process for large group rates is very different. 96
Large insurers create and file “Large Group Rating Models” with the
OIC. 97 The OIC reviews these models, requiring the insurer to respond

89. McCarthy, 182 Wash. 2d at 941, 347 P.3d at 875.
90. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE §§ 48.44.020(2)–(3), 48.44.110 (2014)).
91. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-43-6100 (2016).
92. A small group employer is an employer with up to fifty employees. See Frequently Asked
Questions About Health Insurance Rates, WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF THE INSURANCE COMM’R,
https://www.insurance.wa.gov/your-insurance/health-insurance/health-rates/freqently-asked-questions/
[https://perma.cc/7WVP-DBVA] [hereinafter FAQ About Health Insurance Rates] (under “How we
review rates”).
93. See id.
94. MIKE KREIDLER, OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R, THE STATE OF WASHINGTON’S UNINSURED
2014–2015, 15 fig.4-2 (2016), https://www.insurance.wa.gov/about-oic/reports/commissionerreports/documents/2014-2015-state-of-uninsured.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPZ4-M3XG] [hereinafter
WASHINGTON’S UNINSURED].
95. Id. The rest of Washington’s health insurance (other than individual, small group employer,
and large group employer providers) largely comes from Medicaid (twenty-five percent of
Washington’s insured) and Medicare (seventeen percent). Id.
96. See FAQ About Health Insurance Rates, supra note 92 (under “How we review rates”) (“We
also review the policies for large employer health plans (51+ employees), but most employers can
negotiate the rates with their insurance company.” (emphasis added)).
97. Premera, Premera Blue Cross, and Lifewise Health Plan of Washington’s Motion for
Summary Judgment at 1–2, McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, No. 122015708, 2013 WL 9008317
(Wash. Super. Jan. 4, 2013), 2012 WL 11386547.
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to various “objections” the OIC might have. 98 The insurer then directly
negotiates its actual rates with its large group insureds. 99 After the
insurer and the large group insureds negotiate their rates, the insurer files
its individual large group contracts with the OIC. 100 The OIC is
empowered to disapprove these large group contracts on various
grounds, including in situations where the OIC determines that “the
benefits provided therein are unreasonable in relation to the amount
charged for the contract.” 101 No part of the statutory scheme, however,
requires the OIC to review and affirmatively approve those rates, and
indeed it appears that the OIC chooses not to do so. 102
2.

Washington Has Implicitly Adopted a State Version of the Filed
Rate Doctrine That Bars Suits Alleging Artificially High Rates

To date, there have been only three published Washington cases that
consider the filed rate doctrine, resulting in two opinions by the
Washington State Supreme Court and one by the Court of Appeals. 103
Though Washington courts have never explicitly stated that they are
98. Id.
99. Id. (“One important difference between large group and small group or individual rates is that
the large group rates are customized for each group after individualized negotiations between
Premera and each individual group.”).
100. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 48.44.040 (2016).
101. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.44.020(3) (2016). The OIC may also disapprove the contracts for
any of the reasons listed in § 48.44.020(2), which empowers the OIC to reject any individual or
group contract:
(a) If it contains or incorporates by reference any inconsistent, ambiguous or misleading
clauses, or exceptions and conditions which unreasonably or deceptively affect the risk
purported to be assumed in the general coverage of the contract; or (b) If it has any title,
heading, or other indication of its provisions which is misleading; or (c) If purchase of health
care services thereunder is being solicited by deceptive advertising; or (d) If it contains
unreasonable restrictions on the treatment of patients; or (e) If it violates any provision of this
chapter; or (f) If it fails to conform to minimum provisions or standards required by regulation
made by the commissioner pursuant to chapter 34.05 RCW; or (g) If any contract for health
care services with any state agency, division, subdivision, board, or commission or with any
political subdivision, municipal corporation, or quasi-municipal corporation fails to comply
with state law.
102. See How We Review Health Rates, WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF THE INSURANCE
COMM’R,
https://www.insurance.wa.gov/your-insurance/health-insurance/health-rates/how-wereview-rates/ [https://perma.cc/RXC6-6XU2] (“We review all rate requests for individual and smallgroup plans (employers with 1–50 employees) in Washington state.”); Search Health Insurance
Rate Increases, WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF THE INSURANCE COMM’R, https://www.insurance.
wa.gov/health-rates/Search.aspx [https://perma.cc/NRB9-NWLM] (database for rate increase
requests for individuals and small groups only).
103. See McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, 182 Wash. App. 1, 11–12, 328 P.3d 940, 946 (2014)
(noting that, prior to McCarthy, there were only two filed rate cases in Washington—one by the
Washington State Supreme Court and one by the Washington Court of Appeals), rev’d 182 Wash.
2d 936, 944, 347 P.3d 872, 876 (2015).
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adopting the filed rate doctrine, it appears that these cases implicitly
adopted a Washington State version. 104
The Washington State Supreme Court first considered the filed rate
doctrine in Tenore v. AT&T Wireless. 105 In that case, customers
challenged AT&T’s nondisclosure of its practice of rounding up phone
call durations to the next highest minute. 106 AT&T argued that, under the
filed rate doctrine, it could not be subject to the lawsuit because
calculating the plaintiffs’ damages—the amount that the plaintiffs had
overpaid as a result of the billing practice—would require a court to
calculate a reasonable rate for phone service. 107 As a preliminary matter,
the Court decided that the federal filed rate doctrine did not apply
because the defendants in that case were specifically exempted from
filing tariffs with the FCC. 108
In dicta relevant to the filed rate doctrine, however, the Court then
considered whether the claims were nonetheless barred on federal
preemption grounds—specifically, the Court considered whether the
Federal Communications Act completely preempted plaintiffs’ state law
claims by barring “State or local government . . . authority to regulate
the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or
any private mobile service.” 109 The Court noted that “[t]he award of
damages is not per se state regulation, and as the United States Supreme
Court has observed, does not require a court to ‘substitute its judgment

104. See id. at 11, 328 P.3d at 946. As noted by the Washington Court of Appeals in McCarthy,
prior to its consideration of that case, only two published Washington cases had considered the filed
rate doctrine in Washington: Tenore and Hardy. Id. at 11–12, 328 P.3d at 946. Both of those cases,
however, dealt with the federal version of the filed rate doctrine. See Tenore v. AT&T Wireless,
136 Wash. 2d 322, 334, 962 P.2d 104, 109–10 (1998) (noting that whether the filed rate doctrine
applied to that case depended on whether the defendant telecommunications companies had filed
their rates with the Federal Communications Commission); Hardy v. Claircom Comms. Grp., 86
Wash. App. 488, 490–91, 937 P.2d 1128, 1130–32 (1997) (noting that “[t]he filed tariff doctrine
arises under the Federal Communications Act,” which required the telecommunications company
defendant to file its tariffs with the FCC). The Washington Court of Appeals indicated that the
Washington courts had at least implicitly adopted the doctrine in Washington, however, when it
stated that “[w]hether to extend the filed rate doctrine to a claim involving health insurance is a
question of first impression.” McCarthy, 182 Wash. App. at 11, 328 P.3d at 946. The Washington
State Supreme Court, on review, did not consider this “question of first impression,” further
indicating that a state version of the doctrine has been implicitly adopted. See McCarthy Fin., Inc. v.
Premera, 182 Wash. 2d 936, 347 P.3d 872 (2015).
105. 136 Wash. 2d 322, 962 P.2d 104 (1998).
106. Id. at 327, 962 P.2d at 106.
107. Id. at 328–29, 962 P.2d at 107.
108. Id. at 334, 962 P.2d at 109–10.
109. Id. at 328, 962 P.2d at 110.
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for the agency’s on the reasonableness of a rate.’” 110 Accordingly, the
plaintiffs’ state law claims and the damages they sought were not
preempted by the Federal Communications Act. 111
In Hardy v. Claircom Communications Group, 112 the Washington
Court of Appeals determined that the filed rate doctrine barred
customers’ claims against the defendant for failing to disclose its billing
practices. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant breached its
contract and violated the Washington Consumer Protection Act (WCPA)
by failing to disclose that its billing practice was to round up charges
from its air-to-ground telephones in commercial aircraft to the next
highest minute, thereby increasing the cost of the plaintiffs’ telephone
use. 113 The plaintiffs reasoned that the filed rate doctrine should not bar
their claims because they were “specifically challenging the allegedly
deceptive advertising practices of [the defendants], not the underlying
rate.” 114
The court determined that, irrespective of the plaintiffs’ claim that
they were not challenging the reasonableness of the rates, the damages
calculation that the court would be required to perform barred the
plaintiffs’ actions. 115 The court reasoned that it would, in other words,
have to determine what a reasonable rate would have been as a baseline
for assessing damages. 116 The court, moreover, invoked the nondiscrimination strand of filed rate, finding that:
[A]ny court-imposed award of damages would by definition
result in [the plaintiffs] paying something other than the filed
rate . . . . Significantly, neither [plaintiff] alleges that they or any
other customer has paid anything other than the filed rate. Both
of their claims are thus barred by the filed tariff doctrine. 117
In McCarthy Finance, Inc. v. Premera, 118 the Washington State
Supreme Court had an opportunity to consider the filed rate doctrine in
the state regulatory context. In that case, the Court was asked to consider
whether the filed rate doctrine barred the plaintiffs’ WCPA claims
110. Id. at 345, 962 P.2d at 115 (quoting Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 299
(1976)).
111. Id.
112. 86 Wash. App. 488, 937 P.2d 1128 (1997).
113. Id. at 490, 937 P.2d at 1130.
114. Id. at 494, 937 P.2d at 1132.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 494–95, 937 P.2d at 1132.
118. 182 Wash. 2d 936, 347 P.3d 872 (2015).

17 - Powell.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

3/21/2017 3:25 PM

“A NUANCED APPROACH”

499

against their insurance provider and the Washington Alliance for
Healthcare Insurance Trust (WAHIT) for allegedly “collud[ing] and
ma[king] false and misleading representations to the plaintiffs that
induced the plaintiffs to purchase health insurance policies under false
pretenses.” 119 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the
defendants’ WCPA violations, the plaintiffs paid “excessive,
unnecessary, unfair and deceptive overcharges for health insurance”
even though their rates had been approved by the Washington OIC. 120
The Court noted at the outset that a claim for damages relating to the
plaintiffs’ insurance premiums was not per se barred by the filed rate
doctrine. 121 Rather, it was up to courts to “determine whether the claims
and damages are merely incidental to agency-approved rates and
therefore may be considered by courts or would necessarily require
courts to reevaluate agency-approved rates and therefore may not be
considered by courts.” 122 The Court stated that “[i]n most cases, courts
must consider [WCPA] claims even when the requested damages are
related to agency-approved rates.” 123 The Court, however, qualified this
broad command, noting that such a WCPA claim would be able to
proceed only “to the extent that claimants can prove damages without
attacking agency-approved rates” because it was in those cases that the
benefits of considering the plaintiffs’ WCPA claims would outweigh any
value in dismissing those claims under filed rate. 124
For that reason, the plaintiffs in McCarthy might have been able to
proceed on their WCPA claim—but those plaintiffs, “rather than
requesting general damages or seeking any damages that [did] not
directly attack agency-approved rates,” requested refunds of the
overpayments they allegedly made in addition to the insurance
company’s alleged surplus. 125 Specifically, the plaintiffs sought two
forms of damages, both of which expressly asked for a refund of
premiums paid: first, the plaintiffs requested “a refund[] of the gross and
excessive overcharges in premium payments” that resulted from the
defendant’s unfair business practices and excessive premiums; second,
119. Id. at 939, 347 P.3d at 873–74.
120. Id. at 940, 347 P.3d at 874.
121. Id. at 942–43, 347 P.3d at 875 (“The mere fact that a claim is related to an agency-approved
rate is no bar.”).
122. Id. at 942, 347 P.3d at 875 (emphasis added) (citing Tenore v. AT&T Wireless, 136 Wash.
2d 322, 344, 962 P.2d 104, 115 (1998)).
123. Id. at 943, 347 P.3d at 875.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 943, 347 P.3d at 875–76.
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the plaintiffs sought a refund of the excess surplus to the insureds who
paid the “high premiums causing the excess.” 126 Because the plaintiffs
sought damages that would necessarily require a court to calculate a
reasonable rate for their insurance premiums, the plaintiffs’ claims were
barred by the filed rate doctrine. 127 The Court reasoned that:
[A]warding either of the two specific damages requested by the
Policyholders would run contrary to the purposes of the filed
rate doctrine because the court would need to determine what
health insurance premiums would have been reasonable for the
Policyholders to pay as a baseline for calculating the amount of
damages[,] and the OIC has already determined that the health
insurance premiums paid by the Policyholders were
reasonable. 128
3.

The Future Application of the Filed Rate Doctrine in Washington
Is Unsettled

It is unclear from these few cases how Washington would treat a
claim involving a filed rate against a defendant for failure to perform
services promised in a contract. The Washington Supreme Court seems
willing to hear claims that tangentially involve filed rates but do not
challenge the reasonableness of those rates—especially WCPA
claims. 129 But the Washington State Supreme Court has also been
careful to note that the damages calculations in those cases would need
to be calculated “to the extent that claimants can prove damages without
attacking agency-approved rates.” 130 In particular, the Court barred the
claims by the McCarthy plaintiffs on the ground that it would be
required to determine as a baseline a reasonable rate for insurance
premiums, which violated the non-justiciability strand of the filed rate
doctrine. 131 But the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision in
McCarthy provided little guidance on what might constitute a claim that
did not “attack” an agency-approved rate—a gap that this Comment
seeks to address by considering the purposes of the filed rate doctrine. 132
126. Id. at 940, 347 P.3d at 874.
127. Id. at 943–44, 347 P.3d at 876.
128. Id. at 943, 347 P.3d at 876 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 943, 347 P.3d at 875 (“[T]he benefits gained from courts’ considering CPA claims
outweigh any benefit that would be derived from applying the filed rate doctrine to bar the
claims.”).
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 943, 347 P.3d at 876.
132. See infra Part IV.
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It is unclear whether Washington courts would treat a claim alleging
nonperformance of promised services differently than a claim for
excessive premiums. But it seems, based on the decision of the court of
appeals in Hardy, that it does not matter whether the court would be able
to assign a reasonable value to the complained-of conduct—in that case,
overcharging consumers by rounding up the call times—and subtract
that from the price actually paid. That is, it seems plausible that the
Hardy court could have calculated the damages to each individual
caller—presuming that the defendants kept records of call times prerounding—and then subtracted that total from the rate paid. The court
declined to do so, however, following the same reasoning in McCarthy
and holding that the damages calculation in that case would
impermissibly require the court to engage in ratemaking. Hardy,
however, was a case involving federally-filed rates, 133 and need not
dictate the outcome in future Washington State filed rate cases. Which
Washington claims (and which measures of damages) might be
dismissed under the filed rate doctrine, therefore, is uncertain.
B.

Oregon Does Not Have a State Version of the Filed Rate Doctrine

Oregon courts, unlike Washington courts, have not applied the filed
rate doctrine in their state. 134 But Oregon has given some more
indication of what that doctrine might look like should Oregon courts
decide to adopt filed rate—that is, that it will not adopt the doctrine
nearly as rigidly as it is applied elsewhere.135 This section begins by
discussing the insurance regulatory scheme in Oregon before moving on
to examining Oregon’s consideration of the filed rate doctrine. The
section concludes by hypothesizing what the filed rate doctrine might
look like in Oregon if the state decides to adopt it.
1.

The Oregon Insurance Regulatory Framework

Insurers in Oregon are required to file their rates, rating plans, and
rating systems with the Director of the Department of Consumer and
Business Services (DCBS). 136 The Director determines whether the
rates, rating plans, or rating systems comply with Oregon’s insurance

133.
134.
135.
136.

See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
Dreyer v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 142 P.3d 1010, 1014 n.10 (Or. 2006).
See infra section III.B.3.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 737.205 (West 2016).
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regulations. 137 Insurance rates in Oregon “shall not be excessive,
inadequate or unfairly discriminatory. 138 Rates are excessive when they
are “unreasonably high for the insurance provided[,] and . . . [a]
reasonable degree of competition does not exist” in that particular
insurance arena. 139
Health insurance rates are reviewed by the DCBS in much the same
way that they are reviewed in Washington; that is, the DCBS reviews
and approves rates only for individuals who do not get insurance through
an employer and small employers with fifty or fewer employees. 140 The
DCBS does not review rates for large groups (with more than fifty
employees), as those “groups negotiate prices with the insurer.” 141
2.

Oregon Has Refused to Adopt the Filed Rate Doctrine

Oregon courts, though noting that the doctrine exists, have avoided
the question of whether filed rate is applicable under Oregon law.142 But
the reasoning of some related Oregon cases suggests that if Oregon
courts were to adopt filed rate, they would not apply a strict version of
the doctrine.
In Dreyer v. Portland General Electric Co., 143 the Oregon Supreme
Court avoided the question of whether the filed rate doctrine applied in
Oregon to bar the plaintiffs’ claims. 144 In Dreyer, plaintiffs in
consolidated class actions brought a claim against defendant Portland
General Electric (PGE) alleging that PGE had wrongfully charged its
customers for the undepreciated value of one of its former—and now
closed—power plants. 145 Plaintiffs sought a refund “of all amounts that
ratepayers unlawfully had to pay” during the period PGE charged for the

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. § 737.045 (Westlaw).
Id. § 737.310(1) (Westlaw).
Id. § 737.310(2)(a) (Westlaw).
DEP’T OF CONSUMER & BUS. SERVS., CONSUMER GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURANCE RATE
REVIEW IN OREGON 6 (2015), http://dfr.oregon.gov/healthrates/Documents/4961.pdf [https://perma.
cc/R9CQ-3NWX] [hereinafter RATE REVIEW IN OREGON].
141. Id.; see also id. at 7 (for large group insurance plans (fifty or more employees), “[e]mployers
negotiate rates directly with the insurance company; these plans’ rates are not subject to state
regulation”).
142. See Dreyer v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 142 P.3d 1010, 1014 n.10 (Or. 2006).
143. 142 P.3d 1010 (Or. 2006).
144. Id. at 1014 n.10; see also Bates v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1318,
1350 (D. Or. 2014) (noting that no Oregon court has ever decided whether the filed rate doctrine
applies in Oregon).
145. Dreyer, 142 P.3d at 1011.
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plant. 146 After a complicated procedural history involving multiple suits
and the Oregon Public Utility Commission (PUC), PGE petitioned the
Oregon Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus ordering the county
circuit court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ actions and vacate the order
granting class certification. 147
Though the Oregon Supreme Court said that it would not decide
whether the filed rate doctrine applied in light of section 757.225 of the
Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) (requiring utilities to charge only their
filed rates), 148 it did express some uncertainty as to whether the filed rate
doctrine would bar plaintiffs’ claims for damages even if the doctrine
were applicable in Oregon. 149 The Court noted that it “share[d]
plaintiffs’ skepticism of the proposition that is at the heart of PGE’s
argument—that ORS 757.225 manifests a legislative intent that PUCapproved rates be treated as conclusively lawful for all purposes ‘until
they are changed as provided in ORS 757.210 to 757.220.’” 150 Rather,
the Court reasoned, “The statute is not aimed, as PGE suggests, at
conclusively and permanently binding the entire world to the rate
decisions of the PUC.” 151
In a related later case involving the same allegedly unlawful PGE
rates, the Oregon Court of Appeals interpreted two statutes—one
addressing the inclusion of undepreciated investments in rates 152 and one
addressing the exclusion of certain costs from rates 153—to determine
whether PGE was permitted to charge its customers for the
undepreciated value of its closed plant. 154 The court of appeals
determined that the PUC had erred in permitting PGE to charge its
customers for more than the principal amount of its “undepreciated
investment” in the closed power plant. 155 The court reversed the
consolidated cases and remanded with instructions for the PUC to
reconsider its rates. 156

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1011.
Id. at 1014 n.10.
Id. at 1018–19.
Id.
Id. at 1019.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 757.140(2) (West 2016).
Id. § 757.355 (Westlaw).
Citizens’ Util. Bd. v. PUC, 962 P.2d 744, 746–47 (Or. App. 1998).
Id. at 750.
Id. at 752.
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On reconsideration, the PUC “clarified its understanding of [the
Oregon Supreme Court’s] decision in Dreyer, particularly noting that
[the Oregon Supreme Court] had not determined the scope of the filed
rate doctrine or its impact on the PUC’s remedial authority.” 157
Accordingly, the PUC “concluded that it had remedial authority [to
order issue of a refund] . . . . The PUC [thus] ordered PGE to issue a
refund to the post-2000 ratepayers” to compensate them for the
difference between what they paid following a settlement in a related
case and the rates they would have paid if PGE had filed rates without
the unlawful inclusion of some of its power plant losses. 158
In Gearhart v. Public Utility Commission of Oregon, 159 customers in
a class action and the Utility Reform Project challenged the PUC’s
reexamination of previously authorized rates to determine whether
PGE’s customers had suffered injury, arguing that the court should adopt
“a rule against retroactive ratemaking.” 160 The Court declined to hold
that the rule against retroactive ratemaking applied in Oregon under all
circumstances, but decided that:
It is sufficient for present purposes to conclude, as we do, that
the rule against retroactive ratemaking does not preclude the
action that the PUC took on remand in this case. The PUC did
not alter PGE’s rates retroactively, but rather used ratemaking
principles to calculate the rates that it would have authorized
PGE to charge had it not included a return on the investment in
[the closed plant]. 161
In coming to that decision, the Court noted that it was important that
it had not accepted the “extreme” version of the filed rate doctrine that
PGE had urged in Dreyer. 162 Rather, it emphasized that in Dreyer, “the
[C]ourt rejected the notion that PGE was shielded from liability because
it was required by ORS 757.225 to charge the rates that were later held
157. Gearhart v. Public Util. Comm’n of Or., 339 P.3d 904, 911 (Or. 2014).
158. Id. at 913.
159. 339 P.3d 904 (Or. 2014).
160. Id. at 917. The rule against retroactive ratemaking is a related doctrine to filed rate, but has
important differences. See Stefan H. Krieger, The Ghost of Regulation Past: Current Applications of
the Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking in Public Utility Proceedings, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 983,
986 n.8 (1991) (“Closely related to, but distinct from, the rule against retroactive ratemaking is the
‘filed rate doctrine.’ That doctrine forbids a utility from charging rates other than those properly
filed with the commission. Although courts have relied on the filed rate doctrine as one of the bases
for the retroactivity rule, this doctrine is in fact a limitation on the power of utilities, not
commissions.” (citations omitted)).
161. Gearhart, 339 P.3d at 917.
162. Id. at 918.
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to improperly include a return on the investment in” the closed plant. 163
Accordingly, the Court concluded in Gearhart:
Thus, unlike some courts, this [C]ourt has not read ORS 757.225
as a manifestation of legislative intent to allow retroactive relief
only when a utility collects rates different from those approved
by the PUC . . . . Dreyer instead suggests that a utility that
collects rates approved by the PUC may have to return a portion
of those rates if they are later found to be invalid on judicial
review. 164
Courts in other Oregon cases have been similarly unwilling to apply
the filed rate doctrine to bar a plaintiff’s claims. 165
3.

Oregon Has Implicitly Rejected a Traditional Application of the
Filed Rate Doctrine

Though Oregon courts have not adopted the filed rate doctrine in that
state, Oregon has evinced a willingness to permit challenges to approved
rates, 166 to allow courts to remand orders to the regulating agency where
the approved rate included an unlawful charge, 167 and to permit the
regulating agency to issue refunds for rates unlawfully charged.168
Indeed, in its proclamation that the statute requiring utilities to charge
the filed rate “is not aimed . . . at conclusively and permanently binding
the entire world to the rate decisions of the PUC[,]” 169 the Oregon
Supreme Court seems to suggest that—unlike courts that will permit no
variation between the approved rate and the customer’s out-of-pocket
payment to the company—approval by a regulating agency does not
insulate the company’s rates from challenge or refund.
163. Id.
164. Id. (emphasis added). See also Gearhart v. Public Util. Comm’n of Or., 299 P.3d 533, 545
(Or. App. 2013) (in interpreting the Dreyer decision, the court of appeals noted that the filed rate
statute “in and of itself does not absolutely shield a utility from having to return any part of its rates
that later is adjudged to be unlawful”).
165. See, e.g., Bates v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1350 (D. Or. 2014)
(“Assuming arguendo that Oregon has adopted or would adopt the filed-rate doctrine under
appropriate circumstances, it is inapposite here. Plaintiffs state expressly that their claims are not
premised on any challenge to Bankers’ authority to raise its premium rates or to the validity of the
rates that they have been charged . . . .” (emphasis added in final clause)); Adamson v. WorldCom
Comms., Inc., 78 P.3d 577, 582 (Or. App. 2003) (holding that where a tariff is filed, the terms of the
tariff control except where the claim is unrelated to the tariff; “[i]n other words, merely because a
tariff exists does not necessarily mean a claim is barred”).
166. See Dreyer v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 142 P.3d 1010, 1018–19 (Or. 2006).
167. See Citizens’ Util. Bd. v. PUC, 962 P.2d 744, 752 (Or. App. 1998).
168. See Gearhart, 339 P.3d at 918–19.
169. Dreyer, 142 P.3d at 1019.
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Accordingly, Oregon courts are unlikely to use the filed rate doctrine
to bar at the outset a request for damages based on premiums paid to an
insurance company whose rates are filed in Oregon. And, if the Oregon
courts were to adopt the filed rate doctrine, that doctrine would almost
certainly look very different than it appears elsewhere, as Oregon courts
have already effectuated the kind of “rebates” that some courts applying
filed rate appear to avoid.
C.

California Application of the Filed Rate Doctrine is Inconsistent

California, unlike Washington and Oregon, has embodied its filed rate
doctrine in the insurance arena in statute for most kinds of insurance. 170
California’s statutory filed rate doctrine, however, does not apply to
health insurance. 171 For that reason, California courts expressly disagree
with each other about whether the common law filed rate doctrine
applies to other California insurance—and, indeed, they disagree about
whether it applies in other contexts as well. 172 This section proceeds in
four segments. It begins by discussing the health insurance regulatory
framework in California. It then moves on to describing the insurance
regulatory scheme in that state, noting how California’s version of the
filed rate doctrine (for insurance other than health insurance) is
embodied in statute. But despite the statutory nature of California’s filed
rate doctrine for insurance other than health insurance, courts still
disagree about whether that statutory scheme—like common law filed
rate in some jurisdictions—bars suits related to agency-approved rates.
The section then considers the filed rate doctrine in the utility context
before concluding with an analysis of the likely future application of the
filed rate doctrine in California.
1.

The California Health Insurance Regulatory Framework

In California, health insurers are required to file rate information for
individual and small group health insurance policies before
implementing a rate change. 173 Health insurers are required to file rate
change information for large group health insurance policies only when
the change amounts to an “unreasonable rate” increase. 174

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See CAL. INS. CODE § 1860.1 (West 2016).
Id. § 1851 (Westlaw).
See infra sections III.C.2–3.
CAL. INS. CODE. § 10181.3(a) (West 2017).
Id. § 10181.4(a) (Westlaw).
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“‘Unreasonable rate increase’ has the same meaning as that term is
defined in the [Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act].” 175 The rate
filing must be accompanied by an actuarial certification of the rate’s
reasonableness or unreasonableness. 176 If the rate is unreasonable, that
rate must also include a justification for the increase. 177 All of the rate
filing information submitted under these laws must be made publicly
available by the California Department of Insurance with the exception
of the contracted rates between health insurers and providers/large
groups. 178
The Department of Insurance reviews the filings, posts the rate
increase information on its websites and permits public comment on the
postings, and reports to the Legislature on unreasonable rate filings. 179
Furthermore, if the Insurance Commissioner determines that a rate
increase is unreasonable or unjustified, or that a rate filing contains
inaccurate information, the Department posts that decision on its
website, 180 and the health insurer is required to “provide notice of that
determination to any individual or small group applicant.” 181 However,
“[w]hile the Commissioner can request that the insurer amend the rate
change or make an official determination that the proposed rate change
is unreasonable, the Commissioner does not have the authority to deny
or approve proposed rate changes.” 182
Thus, unlike its counterparts in Washington and Oregon, the
California Department of Insurance is not empowered to disapprove
health insurance rates. For that reason, it seems unlikely that the filed
rate doctrine would ever apply (at least under the current statutory
scheme) to claims against health insurers in California. The following
sections, however, attempt to discern what that doctrine might look like
if it were to apply to health insurance by detailing how the doctrine has
applied in other regulatory contexts in California.

175. Id. § 10181 (Westlaw).
176. Id. § 10181.6 (Westlaw).
177. Id. § 10181.6(b) (Westlaw).
178. Id. § 10181.7 (Westlaw).
179. Id. § 10181.11 (Westlaw).
180. Id. § 10181.11(f) (Westlaw).
181. Id. § 10181.3(g) (Westlaw).
182. Rate Fillings and Review, CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF INSURANCE, http://www.insurance.ca.gov/
01-consumers/110-health/70-rates/ [https://perma.cc/4CAP-39G4]. Some courts have argued that
the mere review of filed rates, rather than their application, is enough to trigger the filed rate
doctrine. See infra Part IV.B. The Ninth Circuit, however, has rejected this argument. See Wileman
Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Giannini, 909 F.2d 332, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Application of the Filed Rate Doctrine to Insurance Other than
Health Insurance Is Uneven Because It Requires Statutory
Interpretation

Unlike courts in Washington and Oregon, courts in California have
determined that the filed rate doctrine in California is, at least for some
insurance, embodied in statute. 183 Following a voter initiative passed in
1988, certain insurers 184 are required to file a rate application with the
Insurance Commissioner and receive the Commissioner’s approval
before changing any insurance rates. 185 “Once the commissioner’s
decision is final, an insurer must charge only the approved rate . . . . A
consumer, however, may petition the commissioner to review the
continued use of any rate.” 186 Accordingly, application of the filed rate
doctrine to insurance cases (besides health insurance) in California often
depends on an interpretation of the Insurance Code. 187 However,
“California Courts of Appeal have disagreed over whether California
recognizes [the filed rate] doctrine to preclude challenges to rates filed
pursuant to the Insurance Code” 188—that is, California courts disagree
about whether this statutory scheme acts (as the common law filed rate
doctrine does in other jurisdictions) as a bar to lawsuits related to

183. CAL. INS. CODE § 1860.1 (West 2016); see also King v. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co., 129 F. Supp. 3d
925, 933 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“While Defendants’ argument invokes the ‘filed rate doctrine,’ a
judicially-created doctrine that prohibits lawsuits challenging rates approved by a regulatory
agency, California’s statutory scheme explicitly embodies an analogous prohibition in Section
1860.1 of the California Insurance Code. . . . The filed rate doctrine is relevant, if at all, because it
supports courts’ interpretations of the statutes.”).
184. This provision does not apply to health insurance. Pursuant to section 1851 of the California
Insurance Code, “[t]he provisions of this chapter shall apply to all insurance on risks or on
operations in this state, except: . . . (e) [d]isability insurance.” “Disability insurance” under this
statutory scheme includes health insurance. “Disability insurance includes insurance appertaining to
injury, disablement or death resulting to the insured from accidents, and appertaining to
disablements resulting to the insured from sickness.” CAL. INS. CODE § 106(a) (West 2016). “In
statutes that become effective on or after January 1, 2002, the term ‘health insurance’ for purposes
of this code shall mean an individual or group disability insurance policy that provides coverage for
hospital, medical, or surgical benefits.” Id. § 106(b) (Westlaw).
185. Fogel v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
186. Walker v. Allstate Indem. Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132, 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (internal
citation omitted).
187. See, e.g., MacKay v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 905–06 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(interpreting how sections 1860.1, 1860.2, and 1861.03 work together to preclude claims that
attempt to challenge insurance rates); Fogel, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 72–73 (whether plaintiffs’ claims were
barred depended on whether the action complained of fell within the scope of section 1860.1).
188. Leghorn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 950 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing
Fogel, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 74–75; Walker, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 137 n.4; MacKay, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
910).
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agency-approved rates that arise within the Insurance Code itself. Where
California courts do use the filed rate doctrine in these cases, “the filed
rate doctrine provides that rates duly adopted by a regulatory agency are
not subject to collateral attack in court.” 189
The lower California courts expressly disagree with each other about
whether filed rate applies to California insurance cases other than health
insurance. 190 On one side of the divide, many California courts
interpreting and applying the doctrine have determined that the statute
applies to bar most claims; at least two cases have held that plaintiffs
may not challenge an approved rate under a law that is outside the
Insurance Code. 191 In MacKay v. Superior Court, 192 the plaintiffs had
challenged the defendant insurance company’s method of determining
whether an insured was a “Good Driver” for the purposes of California
law permitting a rate reduction. The court held that the statute barred the
plaintiffs’ claims. 193 And in Walker v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 194 the
court similarly ruled that the plaintiffs’ claim that they were charged too
much for insurance and were entitled to a refund was barred by the
statute. 195
On the other side of the divide, the court in Fogel v. Farmers Group,
Inc. 196 determined that a “key distinction” between the filed rate doctrine
and California’s “‘prior approval’ system governing insurance rates”—
the ability of the insurer to issue a rebate—meant that the plaintiff was
not barred from bringing his claim. 197 The distinction was simple: under
the federal system, once rates are filed a carrier cannot give rebates to its
customers and a customer is barred from bringing a lawsuit that would,
if damages were awarded, have the effect of a rebate; the California
statutory scheme, on the other hand, permits an insurer to rebate
excessive premiums to its customers. 198 Thus, the court determined,
“even if the filed rate doctrine applied in the context of a rate approved
189. Leghorn, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (quoting MacKay, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 910) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
190. MacKay, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 910. (“We thus must disagree with Fogel v. Farmers Grp.,
Inc. to the extent that it rejected the application of the filed rate doctrine to California insurances
rates.” (internal citation omitted)).
191. Id.; Walker, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 136.
192. 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
193. Id. at 896.
194. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
195. Id. at 136.
196. 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
197. Id. at 74–75.
198. Id. at 74–75.
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by a state regulatory agency (defendants have pointed to no cases in
which it was), it nevertheless would have no application here.” 199
California federal courts applying California law have also been
unwilling to find that plaintiffs’ claims against insurers are precluded
under filed rate where the plaintiffs do not challenge the rates
themselves. 200 Those decisions appear to be split, however, on whether
the measure of damages might implicate the filed rate doctrine.
Ellsworth v. U.S. Bank, 201 for example, reasoned that “[j]ust because the
damages are based on increased costs incurred as a result of [an] alleged
kickback scheme does not transform a challenge to conduct and
practices into a challenge to the premiums.” 202 The court in Leghorn v.
Wells Fargo Bank, 203 however, noted that although the filed rate doctrine
did not preclude plaintiffs’ claims that their banks were improperly
receiving kickbacks from an insurance company, the filed rate doctrine
could have barred the plaintiffs’ claims if the “[c]omplaint [was]
construed as setting forth the theory that Plaintiffs were harmed by
payment of [the insurance company’s] premiums because those
premiums were improperly inflated by the commissions it paid to [the
bank].” 204
3.

Application of the Filed Rate Doctrine to Utilities Is Similarly
Contradictory

Some California courts applying the filed rate doctrine in the
telecommunications context have found that damages claims requesting
a rebate of rates paid are barred by the doctrine. 205 The courts—like
most others applying filed rate—reason that permitting a refund of rates
would, in effect, permit the plaintiff to receive services at a discounted
rate in violation of the non-discrimination strand of filed rate. 206

199. Id. at 75.
200. Leghorn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 950 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2013);
Ellsworth v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 908 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
201. 908 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
202. Id. at 1083.
203. 950 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
204. Id. at 1115.
205. See, e.g., Gallivan v. AT&T Corp., 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 898 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Day v. AT&T
Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
206. Gallivan, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 905; Day, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 63 (“[Plaintiffs] may not seek to
recover any money from respondents, whether they label their request one for disgorgement or
otherwise. The net effect of imposing any monetary sanction on the respondents will be to
effectuate a rebate, thereby resulting in discriminatory rates.”).
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Not all California courts agree with this analysis, however. The court
in Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court 207 determined that the filed rate
doctrine did not prevent the plaintiffs from bringing an antitrust claim
against cellular providers charging the defendants with price fixing, even
though the rates had been approved by the California Public Utilities
Commission (PUC). In that case, the plaintiffs—individual consumers
and corporate sales agents—brought suit against cellular phone service
providers in San Diego County. 208 The trial court had granted the
defendants demurrer as to two of the plaintiffs’ causes of action alleging
wholesale and retail price fixing of cell phone service rates in the
County, 209 reasoning that the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims were either
precluded or that the plaintiffs needed to bring them to the PUC in the
first instance because the cellular providers’ rates had been approved by
the PUC. 210 The court of appeals disagreed, rejecting the argument that
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Keogh applied in California to
antitrust cases. 211 Rather, the court found that “[n]either the Cartwright
Act nor the Public Utilities Code contains any provision exempting
cellular telephone service providers from the prohibitions of the
Cartwright Act.” 212 The court found it significant that the filed rate
doctrine, if used in this way, could actually incentivize illicit activity
because removing the threat of treble damages under the Cartwright Act
might encourage companies to engage in anticompetitive price fixing. 213
4.

The Future Application of the Filed Rate Doctrine in California Is
Unsettled

Because California health insurance rates are not “approved” by the
Department of Insurance (in that health insurers are not required to get
authorization of their rates prior to charging customers), it is unlikely
that the filed rate doctrine would apply to health insurers required to file
in California. 214 Indeed, one of the stated purposes for the filed rate
doctrine—to preserve the agency’s primary jurisdiction to determine the

207. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
208. Id. at 310.
209. Id. at 311.
210. Id. at 310.
211. Id. at 318–19.
212. Id. at 319.
213. Id.
214. Some courts argue that the filed rate should apply in just these circumstances. See infra
section IV.B.
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reasonableness of rates—would make little sense in California, where
the agency does not have primary jurisdiction to dictate reasonable rates.
However, health insurers in California are still permitted to charge
only the rates they have on file with the Department of Insurance unless
and until they file to change those rates. To the extent, then, that a court
may invoke the filed rate doctrine to rates filed with—but not approved
by—the state Department of Insurance, it seems likely that courts would
draw on the filed rate doctrine as it is applied to utilities (currently
analyzed under a common law version of the filed rate doctrine) and
insurance other than health insurance (analyzed under the California
Insurance Code’s statutory scheme). Unfortunately, California courts
directly contradict each other on whether and how the filed rate doctrine
applies in California under both of these versions of filed rate. Clarity on
the filed rate doctrine in California would require either a California
Supreme Court case on the topic or for the lower courts to begin
overruling their prior (contradictory) cases.
IV. IN WASHINGTON, THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE SHOULD
NOT APPLY TO CLAIMS OF WRONGFUL CONDUCT THAT
ARE INDEPENDENT OF RATES
The filed rate doctrine should apply to claims that allege unreasonable
rates, but it should not apply to other claims that, if successful, might
result in a rebate of those rates. There is a difference between, on the one
hand, claims that assert that the rates approved by a regulating agency
are artificially high because of some wrongful conduct committed by the
defendant and, on the other hand, claims that the defendant committed
some wrongful conduct that entitles the plaintiffs to a return of some of
the rate paid. The former alleges that the plaintiffs should have received
the same services for lower rates; the latter alleges that the plaintiffs
would have been satisfied to pay the rate approved by the OIC if they
had received the services promised, but that the defendant either
breached a contract or committed some other violation of the law
(usually in the WCPA arena). 215 The former claim should be barred by
the filed rate doctrine; the latter should not. What is needed, therefore, is

215. See, e.g., Beller v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 778 N.Y.S.2d 82, 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(where plaintiff brought claims for breach of contract based on the defendant insurance company’s
alleged failure to lower her premiums as required by their contract, the filed rate doctrine did not
apply because the plaintiff did not “challenge the reasonableness of the maximum rates set forth in
the policy, nor [did] she claim that she should have been treated differently from any other
subscriber”).
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a “nuanced approach” that seeks to “consider[] the specifics of the claim
and the policy basis for the filed rate doctrine.” 216
A.

Application of the Filed Rate Doctrine to Cases Involving Breach
of Contract or WCPA Claims Is Contrary to the Doctrine’s
Purposes

Where plaintiffs allege only that the agency-approved rates that they
paid were artificially high because of some wrongful conduct by the
defendant, it makes sense to apply the filed rate doctrine. A good
illustration of a case asserting artificially high rates is the recent
Washington case of McCarthy Finance, Inc. v. Premera. As noted in
section III.A.2, the plaintiffs in McCarthy alleged that their insurance
provider and the Washington Alliance for Healthcare Insurance Trust
(WAHIT) had “colluded and made false and misleading representations
to the plaintiffs that induced the plaintiffs to purchase health insurance
policies under false pretenses” in violation of the WCPA. 217 As a result
of the defendants’ alleged “violations of the [WCPA, the plaintiffs]
experienced excessive, unnecessary, unfair and deceptive overcharges
for health insurance, resulting in Premera obtaining profits of millions of
dollars that helped enable Premera to amass a surplus of approximately
$1 billion.” 218 The plaintiffs sought to recover (1) a refund in their
premiums in the amount that they allegedly overpaid, and (2) a refund of
the surplus that the insurance company had allegedly amassed as a result
of the wrongful rates. 219 The Washington State Supreme Court rejected
the plaintiffs’ claims under the filed rate doctrine because the plaintiffs
could not find some measure of damages that did not directly attack the
amount prescribed by rates they had paid. 220 In essence, the McCarthy
plaintiffs were asserting that, for the services they received, their rates
were too high. In a case like this, where the rates and the underlying
services are evaluated by the OIC, 221 it makes sense for a court to refuse
to reevaluate a decision left by the Legislature to the agency’s discretion.
A very different case is presented by a class of plaintiffs that is
perfectly happy to pay the rate set by the OIC provided that the

216. McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, 182 Wash. App. 1, 14, 328 P.3d 940, 947 (2014), rev’d 182
Wash. 2d 936, 944, 347 P.3d 872, 876 (2015).
217. 182 Wash. 2d 936, 939, 347 P.3d 872, 873–74 (2015).
218. Id. at 940, 347 P.3d at 874 (internal quotation marks omitted).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 943, 347 P.3d at 875–76.
221. Provided that they are, in fact, evaluated—see infra section IV.B.
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regulated entity lives up to its contractual and legal obligations under
that rate schedule. In this type of case, plaintiffs do not allege that their
rates are too high; rather, they allege that they either did not receive the
services that they were promised (say, if their utility refused to maintain
its equipment on their property, as it was obligated to under their
contract 222) or that their company committed some sort of consumer
protection violation not involving the filed rate (say, if an insurance
company failed to disclose a data breach, giving insureds less time to
monitor and protect their personal information 223). In those cases, the
two reasons underlying the filed rate doctrine do not apply.
First, prevention of rate discrimination is inapplicable in cases
involving a breach of contract or injury caused by an insurer’s tort. As
the Supreme Court noted in Keogh—the case establishing filed rate—the
purpose behind non-discrimination is not to ensure that everyone pays
the same amount for the sake of simplicity; rather, non-discrimination
exists to prevent a private plaintiff from getting a “rebate” in damages
that might “operate to give him a preference over his trade
competitors.” 224 But in cases involving breach of contract, the measure
of damages is the amount of money it would take to give the plaintiff the
benefit of the bargain he already struck with the service provider—not
an amount that is intended to give him some advantage over trade
competitors. 225 This is particularly significant in cases where other
customers have not experienced the same breach of contract. In such a
case, a court refusing to award damages on the basis of filed rate
effectuates discriminatory rates: it forces the breached plaintiff to bear
the costs of the defendants’ wrongful conduct while permitting other
plaintiffs to enjoy the benefit of the same rates without the cost of
breach. This reasoning applies with equal force to cases sounding in tort,
where the plaintiff’s measure of damages is not an amount of money that
would give him an unfair advantage over his competitors, but an amount

222. See Hoffman v. Northern States Power Co., 764 N.W.2d 34, 38 (Minn. 2009).
223. See In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litigation, No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2016 WL 3029783,
at *1–3 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016).
224. Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922) (emphasis added).
225. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (West 2016) (the measure of damages
“in general” in a contract action is “damages based on [the party’s] expectation interest, as
measured by (a) the loss in value to him of the other party’s performance caused by its failure or
deficiency, (b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, less
(c) any other cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to perform”).
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that would make him whole for a defendant’s breach of duty. 226
Refusing to make a plaintiff whole on the basis of the filed rate doctrine,
therefore, discriminates in favor of other customers who have not
experienced the same injury and who therefore pay the agency-approved
rate without suffering the same costs. 227
Second, the non-justiciability strand of the filed rate doctrine is
chiefly intended to prevent judicial interference in “a function that
Congress [or the legislature] has assigned to a . . . regulatory body.” 228
But where the legislative body at issue has directly permitted the lawsuit
that the insurer would seek to prevent under the filed rate doctrine,
application of the doctrine no longer makes sense. In Washington, an
insured is expressly permitted to bring a WCPA claim against an
insurer—including a claim based on misrepresentations that are
prohibited in the Insurance Code. 229 As the court of appeals noted in
McCarthy, “[t]he rigid filed rate standard Premera propose[d] would
significantly undercut these provisions.” 230 The Washington Supreme
Court has further emphasized that “while a court must be cautious not to
substitute its judgment on proper rate setting for that of the relevant
agency, the legislature has directed that the [WCPA] be liberally
construed.” 231 To say, then, that the application of the filed rate doctrine
in WCPA cases serves the legislature’s purpose in delegating ratemaking
decisions to the agency ignores the legislature’s purpose in specifically
permitting that very cause of action. The Washington Supreme Court
recognized as much in McCarthy, though the Court in that case was
faced with an excessive premiums claim masquerading as a WCPA
claim:
In most cases, courts must consider [WCPA] claims even when
the requested damages are related to agency-approved rates

226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (West 2016) (defining “compensatory
damages” in tort as “the damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for
harm sustained by him”).
227. Class actions, moreover, have the potential to effect the same rebate for all customers—
thereby eliminating the risk of discrimination among ratepayers. Although the United States
Supreme Court considered this argument insufficient to nullify the filed rate doctrine in Square D
Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 423 (1986), there is no reason that state courts
(including Washington) should not consider this argument in deciding how state versions of the
doctrine might apply.
228. Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 582 (1981).
229. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.170 (2016); McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, 182 Wash. App. 1,
13, 328 P.3d 940, 946 (2014), rev’d 182 Wash. 2d 936, 944, 347 P.3d 872, 876 (2015).
230. McCarthy, 182 Wash. App. at 13, 328 P.3d at 946–47.
231. McCarthy, 182 Wash. 2d at 942, 347 P.3d at 875 (2015).
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because, to the extent that claimants can prove damages without
attacking agency-approved rates, the benefits gained from
courts’ considering [WCPA] claims outweigh any benefit that
would be derived from applying the filed rate doctrine to bar the
claims. 232
Washington courts have spent many years now measuring damages in
the WCPA context 233—there is no reason to believe that they could not
do so for claims against health insurers, at least where those claims do
not allege that the premiums are artificially high.
B.

The Potential Application of the Filed Rate Doctrine in Class
Actions Further Demonstrates the Hazards of Applying the
Doctrine to Cases Only Tangentially Involving Rates

Because of the potential for unnecessary and unfair disparate
treatment, cases of particular concern are class actions involving the
same allegedly wrongful conduct—say, a data breach exposing
customers’ private information to hackers—where some class plaintiffs
are subject to the filed rate doctrine and others are not. In Washington,
the OIC does not affirmatively approve health insurance rates for large
group insurance policies (51 or more employees). Rather, the OIC
collects only rating models from large group policies, allowing the
insurance companies to directly negotiate rates with the large group
insureds. 234 The OIC affirmatively approves rates only for small group
and individual policy filings. 235
This distinction is significant. The Ninth Circuit has held that “failure
to disapprove,” even where an agency is empowered to make such a
disapproval, does not trigger application of the federal filed rate
232. Id. at 943, 347 P.3d at 875.
233. See, e.g., Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co., 166 Wash. 2d 27, 62–63, 204 P.3d 885, 902 (2009)
(collecting cases related to the different ways that Washington courts have measured damages for
WCPA claims).
234. FAQ About Health Insurance Rates, supra note 92 (under “How we review rates”) (“We
also review the policies for large employer health plans (51+ employees), but most employers can
negotiate the rates with their insurance company.”); Premera, Premera Blue Cross, and Lifewise
Health Plan of Washington’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1–2, McCarthy Fin., Inc. v.
Premera, No. 122015708, 2013 WL 9008317 (Wash. Super. Jan. 4, 2013), 2012 WL 11386547, at
*1 (“One important difference between large group and small group or individual rates is that the
large group rates are customized for each group after individualized negotiations between Premera
and each individual group.”).
235. The plaintiffs in McCarthy for some reason chose not to argue the significance of this
distinction in the Washington State Supreme Court, instead deciding “not [to] challenge that the
OIC approved the health insurance premiums that the Policyholders paid.” McCarthy, 182 Wash. 2d
at 942, 374 P.3d at 874.
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doctrine. 236 In Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Giannini, 237 the Ninth
Circuit considered whether the filed rate doctrine barred allegedly unfair
marketing standards that the defendants had promulgated without
authorization from the Secretary of Agriculture. 238 The defendants
argued that the Secretary’s failure to disapprove the standards, in light of
statutory provisions that would have permitted such an action, prevented
the plaintiff’s action under the filed rate doctrine; 239 the court rejected
that argument, reasoning that:
The mere failure to disapprove . . . does not legitimize otherwise
anticompetitive conduct. First, nondisapproval requires neither
publication and comment nor explicit findings. In fact, it does
not guarantee any level of review whatsoever . . . . Second, nondisapproval is equally consistent with lack of knowledge or
neglect as it is with assent. 240
The Ninth Circuit upheld Wileman in Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance
Co. 241 and took the argument a step further—in Brown, the defendant
title insurance company actually filed its rates with state regulatory
agencies, 242 and it was only permitted to charge the rates that it filed. 243
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that its rates were lawful
because they had not been disapproved by the relevant regulatory
agencies, reasoning instead that if the defendant’s “rates were the
product of unlawful activity prior to their being filed and were not
subjected to meaningful review by the state, then the fact that they were
filed does not render them immune from challenge.” 244 In the absence of
meaningful state review, the court went on, insurers are permitted “to

236. Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 393–94 (9th Cir. 1992); Wileman Bros. &
Elliott, Inc. v. Giannini, 909 F.2d 332, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1990); cf. Town of Norwood v. New
England Power Co., 202 F.3d 408, 419 (1st Cir. 2000) (“It is the filing of the tariffs, and not any
affirmative approval or scrutiny by the agency, that triggers the filed rate doctrine.”).
237. 909 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1990).
238. Id. at 333.
239. Id. at 337.
240. Id. at 337–38.
241. 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992).
242. Though the Ninth Circuit in Brown dealt with rates filed with Arizona and Wisconsin
regulatory agencies, it did not appear to consider or apply Arizona or Wisconsin state versions of
the filed rate doctrine (if they exist, which is beyond the scope of this Comment). Id. at 393–94.
Rather, the court continually referred to the filed rate doctrine as the “Keogh doctrine,” an apparent
call out to federal filed rate under Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922). Id.
243. Brown, 982 F.2d at 393–94.
244. Id. at 394.
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file any rates they want,” and so “the act of filing does not legitimize a
rate arrived at by improper action.” 245
If a Washington court were to rigidly apply the filed rate doctrine,
then—applying it only to claims that are actually approved by the
agency—the claims of class plaintiffs who were not part of a large group
insurance policy would likely be barred, while the claims of their large
group co-plaintiffs would likely not be. In such a case, the twin aims of
the filed rate doctrine are undone.
First, rate discrimination would ensue: large group insureds would be
permitted to receive a refund of premiums paid as a measure of
damages, and would therefore in total paying less than their non-large
group counterparts. This is a particularly troublesome possibility
because where agencies do not approve rates for large groups, it is often
because it is assumed that large-group policyholders are in a better
position to bargain for lower rates. 246 If a Washington court were to
rigidly apply the filed rate doctrine in a mixed class case like this, it
would, in effect, further ensure that small group and individual policy
holders were put in worse bargaining positions and forced to pay higher
premiums. This seems particularly harsh in light of the fact that the
WCPA authorizes suits for “unfair competition and unfair, deceptive and
fraudulent acts or practices in order to protect the public and foster fair
and honest competition.” 247 Where a court would deny individual and
small group insureds a WCPA cause of action on the basis of filed rate
(while permitting the claims of their large group counterparts), it would
strike a double blow to those who are most likely hurt by the absence of
“fair and honest competition.”
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the non-justiciability arm of
the filed rate doctrine would no longer apply: the same court that would
dismiss small group and individual policyholders on the basis of the
filed rate doctrine (reasoning that it, as a court, was in no position to
calculate reasonable rates) would necessarily have to decide reasonable
rates as a measure of damages for the large group policyholders anyway.
It makes little sense that a court could dismiss a swath of plaintiffs on
the basis that it cannot calculate a measure of damages that it is poised to
calculate for the rest of the class.

245. Id.
246. See RATE REVIEW IN OREGON, supra note 140, at 6 (“[I]ndividuals and small business
buyers are considered the most vulnerable consumers because they lack the negotiating power of
large groups.”).
247. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.26.920 (2016) (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
Though Washington has left the door open for WCPA claims, even in
the context of filed rates, it needs to do more to draw the line between
cases that challenge the reasonableness of rates charged and cases that
deal with rates only as a tangential matter. While it might make sense to
prevent collateral attack of agency-approved rates when a claim is,
essentially, that the rates are too high, the justifications for the
doctrine—non-discrimination and non-justiciability—are not applicable
to cases where plaintiffs allege a breach of contract or a WCPA
violation. Courts, then, should take care to investigate the gravamen of a
plaintiff’s claims before dismissing on the basis of filed rate, dismissing
only where the plaintiff in essence challenges an agency’s approval of
the rates it must pay. Certainly, this distinction might prove difficult to
implement; California courts, as explained, seem to be struggling with
whether and how to distinguish between cases that challenge rates and
cases that allege some other wrong. But, as is more apparent in Oregon,
there does not seem to be any irreparable harm in refunding rates to
customers for wrongs done them by private companies with filed rates.
Where consumers do not challenge the agency-approved rates
themselves, then, there seems little reason to continue to apply the filed
rate doctrine, especially where doing so would undermine the intent of
the legislature in enacting the WCPA.

